Domingo vs. Rayala (596 SCRA 90)

Domingo vs. Rayala
546 Scra 90

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her ears.  Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must be a demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
. (2)  The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
. (3)  The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Chua vs TOPROS G.R. No. 152808

Facts:

On December 28, 1999, respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc., (TOPROS) lodged a complaint for annulment of contracts of loan and real estate mortgage against herein petitioner Antonio T. Chua before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.

The said suit sought to annul a loan contract allegedly extended by petitioner to respondent TOPROS in the amount of ten million four hundred thousand pesos (P10,400,000) and the accessory real estate mortgage contract covering two parcels of land situated in Quezon City as collateral.

TOPROS alleged that the purported loan and real estate mortgage contracts were fictitious, since it never authorized anybody, not even its president, to enter into said transaction.

On February 28, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He contended that the action filed by TOPROS affects title to or possession of the parcels of land subject of the real estate mortgage. He argued that it should thus have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the encumbered real properties are located, instead of Pasig City where the parties reside.

On August 9, 2000, Judge Pahimna issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. She reasoned that the action to annul the loan and mortgage contracts is a personal action and thus, the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Pasig City where the parties reside.

Issue:

WHETHER AN ACTION TO ANNUL A LOAN AND MORTGAGE CONTRACT IS A PERSONAL ACTION?

Rulings:

Yes.

Well­-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages.

The Court pointed out in the Hernandez case that with respect to mortgage, the rule

on real actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage. Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. The latter thus falls under the catch­all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of the above­cited section, to wit:

SEC. 2 (b) Personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the present case must fall under Section 2 of Rule 4, to wit:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non­resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts.

Del Monte Phil vs Lolita Velasco GR. No. 153477 March 6, 2007

Del Monte Phil vs Lolita Velasco

GR. No. 153477

March 6, 2007

Facts:

Lolita Velasco, respondent herein was dismissed by the petitioner Del Monte Philippines due to excessive absences without permission. The respondent alleged that her absences was due to urinary tract infection, pregnancy-borne and that she filed an application for leave to her supervisor. She also went to see the company doctor for check-up and was advised to rest for four days.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner as illegally dismissed

Rulings:

Yes.  The respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy.

The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and suffered related illnesses. Again, it must be stressed that respondent’s discharge by reason of absences caused by her pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor Code. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained, the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

GPI vs Springer 50 Phil 259

Facts:

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General,  still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

Issue:

Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.

Rulings:

No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

People vs. Butiong Gr. No. 168932

Facts:

This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the police station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). AAA underwent a series of Psychological Test with result showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of Rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

Rulings:

Yes. Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. This understanding of the commission of rape has been prevalent in both the common law and the statutory law systems.

There are four modes of committing the crime of rape as provided in paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, applied in his case, namely:

a.     Through force, threat or intimidation;

b.     When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c.      By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d.     When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even though none of the circumstances first mentioned is present.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra, because the provision refers to a rape of a female “deprived of reason,” a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.

People vs. Jonie Dominguez GR. No. 191065

Facts:

The accused Jonie Dominguez was charged with two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) other counts of simple rape.

AAA was allegedly raped twice: first in 2001 when she was only nine years old, and second on 12 July 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly done under the circumstance of intimidation with a knife. The second instance of rape was allegedly committed by the accused through threats and the use of moral ascendancy over AAA.

BBB, on the other hand, was allegedly raped seven times. The rape was allegedly committed through force, violence and intimidation, and moral ascendancy.

 AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the instances of rape, until their mother accidentally discovered the commission of the crimes from the accused himself.  Overhearing Dominguez in one of his drinking sessions, boasting that the children's vaginas were already wide, she confronted her daughters and asked them about the remark. The children reluctantly confided to her what had happened. 

During the trial, AAA and BBB testified against Dominguez by narrating the lascivious acts he had done to them. According to their testimonies, the accused had employed trickery so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone with him and thereafter raped, with threats of harm to her person or her family.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of Rape.

Rulings:

Yes.

Rape is committed:

1)  By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Before and after the violations, the intimidation took the form of threats that the victims’ family would be killed by the accused. The accused also employed trickery and took advantage of his authority over his grandnieces. Under these circumstances, the accused was able to have carnal knowledge of BBB and  commit a series of sexual assaults against both her and AAA. The two incidents of rape against AAA happened before she reached 12 years of age, she being 9 and 10 then. For those incidents, proof of threats, force or intimidation, is not necessary.  Thus, the accused is guilty as charged.