Del Monte Phil vs Lolita Velasco GR. No. 153477 March 6, 2007

Del Monte Phil vs Lolita Velasco

GR. No. 153477

March 6, 2007

Facts:

Lolita Velasco, respondent herein was dismissed by the petitioner Del Monte Philippines due to excessive absences without permission. The respondent alleged that her absences was due to urinary tract infection, pregnancy-borne and that she filed an application for leave to her supervisor. She also went to see the company doctor for check-up and was advised to rest for four days.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner as illegally dismissed

Rulings:

Yes.  The respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy.

The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and suffered related illnesses. Again, it must be stressed that respondent’s discharge by reason of absences caused by her pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor Code. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained, the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

GPI vs Springer 50 Phil 259

Facts:

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General,  still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

Issue:

Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.

Rulings:

No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

People vs. Butiong Gr. No. 168932

Facts:

This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the police station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). AAA underwent a series of Psychological Test with result showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of Rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

Rulings:

Yes. Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. This understanding of the commission of rape has been prevalent in both the common law and the statutory law systems.

There are four modes of committing the crime of rape as provided in paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, applied in his case, namely:

a.     Through force, threat or intimidation;

b.     When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c.      By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d.     When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even though none of the circumstances first mentioned is present.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra, because the provision refers to a rape of a female “deprived of reason,” a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.

People vs. Jonie Dominguez GR. No. 191065

Facts:

The accused Jonie Dominguez was charged with two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) other counts of simple rape.

AAA was allegedly raped twice: first in 2001 when she was only nine years old, and second on 12 July 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly done under the circumstance of intimidation with a knife. The second instance of rape was allegedly committed by the accused through threats and the use of moral ascendancy over AAA.

BBB, on the other hand, was allegedly raped seven times. The rape was allegedly committed through force, violence and intimidation, and moral ascendancy.

 AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the instances of rape, until their mother accidentally discovered the commission of the crimes from the accused himself.  Overhearing Dominguez in one of his drinking sessions, boasting that the children's vaginas were already wide, she confronted her daughters and asked them about the remark. The children reluctantly confided to her what had happened. 

During the trial, AAA and BBB testified against Dominguez by narrating the lascivious acts he had done to them. According to their testimonies, the accused had employed trickery so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone with him and thereafter raped, with threats of harm to her person or her family.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of Rape.

Rulings:

Yes.

Rape is committed:

1)  By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Before and after the violations, the intimidation took the form of threats that the victims’ family would be killed by the accused. The accused also employed trickery and took advantage of his authority over his grandnieces. Under these circumstances, the accused was able to have carnal knowledge of BBB and  commit a series of sexual assaults against both her and AAA. The two incidents of rape against AAA happened before she reached 12 years of age, she being 9 and 10 then. For those incidents, proof of threats, force or intimidation, is not necessary.  Thus, the accused is guilty as charged.

People vs. Noel T. Sales GR. No 177218

Facts:

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night.  When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home a furious appellant confronted them.  Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house.  With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor.  He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.  Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital.  As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child.  He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing.  In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him.  Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes.  His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

Rulings:

Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior.  As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. 

As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree.  He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.