People vs. Butiong Gr. No. 168932

Facts:

This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the police station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). AAA underwent a series of Psychological Test with result showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of Rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

Rulings:

Yes. Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. This understanding of the commission of rape has been prevalent in both the common law and the statutory law systems.

There are four modes of committing the crime of rape as provided in paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, applied in his case, namely:

a.     Through force, threat or intimidation;

b.     When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c.      By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d.     When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even though none of the circumstances first mentioned is present.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim. It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra, because the provision refers to a rape of a female “deprived of reason,” a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.

People vs. Jonie Dominguez GR. No. 191065

Facts:

The accused Jonie Dominguez was charged with two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) other counts of simple rape.

AAA was allegedly raped twice: first in 2001 when she was only nine years old, and second on 12 July 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly done under the circumstance of intimidation with a knife. The second instance of rape was allegedly committed by the accused through threats and the use of moral ascendancy over AAA.

BBB, on the other hand, was allegedly raped seven times. The rape was allegedly committed through force, violence and intimidation, and moral ascendancy.

 AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the instances of rape, until their mother accidentally discovered the commission of the crimes from the accused himself.  Overhearing Dominguez in one of his drinking sessions, boasting that the children's vaginas were already wide, she confronted her daughters and asked them about the remark. The children reluctantly confided to her what had happened. 

During the trial, AAA and BBB testified against Dominguez by narrating the lascivious acts he had done to them. According to their testimonies, the accused had employed trickery so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone with him and thereafter raped, with threats of harm to her person or her family.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of Rape.

Rulings:

Yes.

Rape is committed:

1)  By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Before and after the violations, the intimidation took the form of threats that the victims’ family would be killed by the accused. The accused also employed trickery and took advantage of his authority over his grandnieces. Under these circumstances, the accused was able to have carnal knowledge of BBB and  commit a series of sexual assaults against both her and AAA. The two incidents of rape against AAA happened before she reached 12 years of age, she being 9 and 10 then. For those incidents, proof of threats, force or intimidation, is not necessary.  Thus, the accused is guilty as charged.

People vs. Noel T. Sales GR. No 177218

Facts:

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night.  When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home a furious appellant confronted them.  Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house.  With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor.  He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.  Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital.  As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child.  He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing.  In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him.  Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes.  His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

Rulings:

Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior.  As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. 

As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree.  He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.

People vs. Cedenio GR. No. 93485

Facts:

On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted with fire. Five members of the family, then occupying the house were burned to death. The five bodies retrieved were those of Mario Hilario Dorio, with wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost severed, Mario Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora Tabanao with a wound in the stomach and infant Dioscora with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.

Two witnesses testified that the three appellants namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo were seen running out of the burning house, holding bolos stained with blood.

Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio borrowed from him a bolo on the night of November 26, and the following morning, the bolo was returned to him with a bloodstain on the handle. The accused Pedro Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this incident reaches the court, I will answer (for) everything”

The trial court found the accused-appelants guilty of Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be charged by a complex crime of arson with murder.

Rulings:

No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard-

…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in the house and that the objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of a building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.

From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed to death, appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. Thus, the appellant are guilty of a separate crime of four counts of murder and arson. And not the complex crime of arson with murder.